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 Autonomous Weapon System (AWS) is still discussed and is 
considered to the principle of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
particular the principle of distinction and proportionality. In line with 
moral and ethical issues, some experts and global citizens agree that 
AWS will likely to distract moral and ethical on a battlefield and are 
never able to replace human’s feeling. Human beings are responsible 
over AWS because there is no such a fully autonomous weapons exist. 
It is always a human commander behind the actions. To bridge the 
situation on discussion of AWS, a new treaty should be created in 
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1.  Introduction  
In the last decades, the proliferation of weapons has increased rapidly. Some of these 
weapons are banned, such as anti-personnel landmines, and biological and chemical 
weapons. Some are just strictly used such as booby-traps. The latest and most 
controversial is Autonomous Weapon System (AWS). Military and robotic experts have 
a prediction that “killer robots” or fully autonomous weapons that can operate without 
human intervention are likely to have been developed within 20-30 years.1 Some states 
that AWS is cost savings. Gordon Johnson argues that ‘they do not get hungry’. They are 
                                                             
1  Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity. The Case Against Killer Robots (19 November 2012) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots>. 
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not afraid. They do not forget orders. They do not care if the guy next to them has just 
been shot. Will they do a better job than humans? Yes.2 
Humans have limited tolerance of the physical extremes of acceleration, temperature, 
and radiation, are vulnerable to biological and chemical weapons and require rest, food, 
breathable air, and drinkable water. Machines are expendable; their loss does not cause 
emotional pain or political backlash. Humans are expensive, and their placement by 
robots is expected to yield cost savings.3 
 
AWS is considered as cheaper than human-operated weapons. Moreover, it has the 
capability to work continuously with a long performance without taking a rest as long 
as their batteries sustain them.4  Those who propose the idea of AWS contend that 
someday they may be compatible with IHL at some point.5In fact, AWS may have better 
capability to comply the principles of IHL than human soldiers.6 
There is a possibility that they may act more conservatively due to the lack of self-
preservation.7 Because of lack of emotions, they will be better in making battlefield 
observations. Moreover, ‘they will be immune to the psychological problem of scenario 
fulfilment.’8 In contrast, Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International 
Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) argue that such development of fully autonomous 
weapons would not be compatible with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and is 
likely to raise the number of injury and dead civilians during armed conflict. Therefore, 
certain issues are going to be addressed in this essay. Firstly, whether the existing 
principles of IHL apply to the use of AWS. These cutting-edge weapons such as drones, 
the principle of targeting strategies and tactics have been countering significant 
changes.9 
This might be the first time in the history of the development of weapons as the most 
appropriate development with the old proverb “technology is a double-edged sword.”10 
Some even suggest that autonomous weapons should not be classified as weapons.11 
Robots are unlike humans, they have no feeling, and the capability to distinguish 
between the civilian and combatant is doubtful. Thus, this can be an advantage or 
disadvantage in war. Pursuant to the Martens Clause, a new weapon could be illegal 
under international law if the principles of humanity or the order of the public 
conscience were infringed.12 
                                                             
2   Weiner, T. ‘GI Robot’s Rolls Toward the Battlefield’, New York Times (online), 1 February 2005 
<http://www.nytimes.com> cited in Foy, J. (2014) ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems’, Dalhousie Journal 
of Legal Studies 47, p.52. 
3  Gubrud, M. (2014) ‘Stopping Killer Robots', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 32, p. 38. 
4  Krishnan, A. (2009) Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, cited in Weiner, above 2. 
5  Noel Sharkey, Staying in the Loop: Human Supervisory Control of Weapons in Bhuta, N., et al. (eds), (2016),  
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Cambridge University Press, pp.23- 24. 
6  Marchant, G.E., et al.,‘International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots’ (2012) 12, Colum Science 
and Technology Law Review 272 cited in Weiner above 2. 
7  Weiner, above 2. 
8  Weiner, above 2. 
9  Solis, G.D. (2016) The Law of Armed Conflict 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, p. 535. 
10   Chengeta, T. (2016). ‘Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Modes of Responsibility 
in International Law’, 45, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1, p. 2. 
11  Solis, above 9. 
12  Human Rights Watch, above n 1. 
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The second concern that needed to be highlighted is the responsibility. Even though until 
today fully autonomous weapons have not existed yet, 13  Debates in regards the 
responsibility of fully autonomous weapons have occurred. Marco Sassóli denies the 
idea of incompatibility of IHL in regulating autonomous weapons. It does not matter 
how state of the art the technology is; there is always a human being at the starting 
point. 14  A human who orders a command through the program system might be 
accountable for individual responsibility. Furthermore, developers of the AWS can also 
be responsible for the violation. This will be elaborated further in this essay. Last, ethical 
concerns regarding fully autonomous weapons also become a significant problem.  
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings recommends that all 
nations should declare moratorium immediately of the development of lethal 
autonomous robotics.15 Thus, this essay will argue that to anticipate violations in armed 
conflicts; a new law is necessary to regulate ultimate fully autonomous weapons. This is 
why national and new international law need to pre-emptively ban the development, 
production, and use of fully AWS. As we know, AWS is not able to replicate the weapon 
that has meaningful human control.  
 
2. Definitions of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) 
The definition of AWS is so various. According to ICRC, AWS is defined as ‘any weapon 
system with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select 
(i.e. search for or detect, identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, 
neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without human intervention.’ Similarly, Peter 
Asaro defines an autonomous weapon system as ‘any system that is capable of targeting 
and initiating the use of potentially lethal force without direct human supervision and 
direct human involvement in lethal decision-making.’16 
There has been a misunderstanding in regards to the definition of the word 
“autonomous”. Generally, people would imagine a robot that is able to find out an 
enemy, decide when to shoot, and initiatively kill selected target.17Moreover, some 
might have an imagination of drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 18 
Nevertheless, either the use of drones or UAV does not meet the definition of 
autonomous weapon systems by ICRC19, which asserts:  
A genuinely autonomous system would have artificial intelligence that would have to 
be capable of implementing IHL. While there are considerable interest and funding for 
research in this area, such systems have not yet been weaponised. The deployment of 
                                                             
13  Schmitt, M.N., and Thurner, J.S. (2013). ”Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law 
of Armed Conflict, 4, Harvard National Security Journal, pp. 231- 234 cited in ibid, 699. 
14  Sassóli, M. (2014). ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clarified’ (90), U.S Naval War College’s International Law Studies 308, pp. 
310-311 cited in Solis, above 3, 544. 
15  C. Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, United Nations 
Document A/HRC/23/47 (April 9, 2013) <www.hrw.org/ reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0>. 
16  Asaro, P. (2012). ‘On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 
Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making’, 94, International Review of the Red Cross, pp. 687-690. 
17  Solis, above n 9, p. 536. 
18  Kua, C. ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems, International Law and Meaningful Human Control’ (8) 1, 
Australian Army Journal, pp. 21-23. 
19  Ibid. 
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such systems would reflect a paradigm shift and a major qualitative change in the 
conduct of hostilities.20 
 
Thus, U.S Department of Defense (DOD) clarifies that ‘all autonomous systems are 
supervised by human operators at some level, and autonomous systems’ software 
embodies the designed limits on the actions and decisions delegated to the computer.’21 
One of the examples of current autonomous weapons is drones or missiles that can hunt 
their targets by using their on-board sensors and computers.22 Sometimes, it is said that 
there are four levels of autonomous weapon systems: human operated, human 
delegated, human-supervised, and fully autonomous.23 In general, Schmitt and Thurner 
state:  
‘Of course, a fully autonomous system is never entirely human-free. Either the system 
designer or an operator would at least have to program it to function under specified 
parameters, and an operator would have to decide to employ it in a particular battle 
space.24  
For instance, South Korea and Israel have used automated sentry guns which have the 
capability to select a target and send an alarm to a human operator who then will decide 
whether to fire or not.25 
Likewise, Captain Cindy Kua argues that indeed, autonomous weapons systems with 
the specific autonomic capability to select target and attack have been used. However, 
fully autonomous systems that are capable to independently decide their actions and 
make complex decisions according to the environment do not exist. Kua also seems 
doubtful that these fully autonomous weapons are unlikely to be developed shortly.26 
However, Benjamin Kastan contends that recently, "dumb" systems, which can operate 
autonomously, exist.27 Similarly, Gubrud provides the Israeli Iron Dome and the U.S 
Patriot and Aegis missile defence systems as fully autonomous systems, which are used 
to employ incoming missiles and artillery rounds.28 
After all, most experts point out that from a technical point of view, there is no clear 
distinction in regards to the definition of AWS and both the main legal and ethical 
questions stay the same.29 
                                                             
20  Kellenberger, J. ‘Keynote Address International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies’ 
(Speech delivered at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, San 
Remo, Italy, 8-10 September 2011) 5-6 <http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/JKBSan%20Remo%20Speech. 
Pdf>. 
21  Department of Defense, Defense of Science Board, Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems 
(2012) 1 (‘Task Force Report’) cited in Solis, above n 9, p. 536. 
22  Gubrud, above n 3, p. 33. 
23  Galdorisi, G. (2015). ‘Keeping Humans in the Loop’ (2015), U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding 36, 38 cited in 
Solis, above n 9, p. 537. 
24  Schmitt and Thurner, above n 13, p. 235. 
25  Lewis, J. (2015). ‘The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons’ 124, The Yale Law Journal, pp. 
1309-1311. 
26  Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects, Expert Meeting, Geneva, 
Switzerland (26-28 March 2014) cited in Kua, above 18, p. 22. 
27  Kastan, B. (2013). ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”? Journal of Law, 
Technology and Policy 45, p. 50. 
28  Gubrud, above n 3, p.38. 
29  ICRC, Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon System, 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (LAWS), Geneva (11-15 April 2016), p. 1. 




3. Principles of International Humanitarian Law and Autonomous Weapon Systems 
Autonomous weapon systems, as well as other weapons, are bound by principles of 
International Humanitarian Law: distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and 
unnecessary suffering. The current debates concerned whether AWS can be compatible 
with the principles of IHL or not because there is no current treaty or convention that 
regulates AWS. 
3.1. Distinction  
The distinction means the state must distinguish between combatants and military 
objectives, non-combatants and civilian objects, and only attack the target directly 
against the former.30 The principle of distinction is also a customary of international law, 
therefore, whether a state has ratified a treaty or not, it is still bound to this principle. 
The base presumption of IHL is ‘an individual who is not a combatant is a civilian.’31 In 
fact, applying this principle is challenging because it often targets is not merely civilian 
in nature, but also they tend to have a military purpose. To illustrate, an Afghani farmer 
openly wearing an AK-47 across his shoulders who is just shepherding his cattle and an 
insurgent Afghani Taliban wearing almost the same clothes and openly carrying 
weapons. 32  Due to the complexity, inability to predict their act in complicated 
operational situations, unpredictable and ambiguous circumstances, a further difficulty 
is likely to occur. Moreover, because the law of armed conflict (LOAC) does not exclude 
‘artificially intelligent autonomy', like other weapons of war, AWS is the subject of the 
same test.33 As it is required in Article 36 of AP I, how can these new weapons be tested 
and verified to fulfil the requirement of IHL34 Therefore, certain types of weapons would 
violate the principle of distinction as well as proportionality, which will be elaborated 
further in the following section, because they fail to minimize the civilian casualties and 
distinguish between civilians and combatants. 35  Gubrud states that ‘weapons not 
capable of being so directed are considered to be indiscriminate and therefore 
prohibited’.36 This type of work is doubtful can be performed by fully autonomous 
weapons. 
On the contrary, some believe that AWS should only use in less complex situations. 
Furthermore, proponents of AWS note that at a certain point the complex command will 
be possible and preferable. How can it be constructed into a machine? It all depends on 
the structure of the program.37 
 
                                                             
30  O'Connell, M.E. ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis' in Fleck, D. (ed), (2013). The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law. Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., p. 36. 
31  Wagner, M. (2014). ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and 
Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ 47, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1371, 
p.1388. 
32  Roff, H.M. (2014). ‘The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War’ (13, Journal of 
Military Ethics, pp. 211-213. 
33  Young, K.D. (2017). The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: A Systematic Inquiry Into the Reliability, 
Vulnerability, and Responsibility of Autonomous Weapons Systems. A Capstone Project, Utica College, p. 37. 
34  Asaro, above n 16, 687, 692-693. 
35  McNab, M., and Matthews, M. (2011).  ‘Clarifying the Law Relating to Unmanned Drones and the Use 
of Force: The Relationships Between Human Rights, Self-Defense, Armed Conflict, and International 
Humanitarian Law’, 39, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 661, p. 690. 
36  Gubrud, above 3, p. 35. 
37  Roff, above 32,  




Proportionality is explained in Article 51 (5)(b) of AP I. It states that “Launching an attack, 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive about the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated, is prohibited”. Then, a disproportionate attack is described 
in Article 51(5)(b): ‘an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.' This 
article then comes with Article 57(2)(a)(iii) of AP I:  
Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from deciding to launch any attack 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive concerning the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
What is more, states are required to take all feasible steps to reduce damage to civilian 
life and objects even if the targets are lawful.38 Feasibility requires a person who launches 
an attack takes appropriate measures to identify the target and reduce civilian casualties 
as far as possible.39As proportionality is one of the most complex rules of IHL, it requires 
a human judgment that a fully autonomous weapon could not do.40There is a military 
advantage that should be targeted, on the other hand, incidental loss or injury to civilian 
as well as the damage to civilian objects should be minimized.41 The US Air Force 
mentions that ‘proportionality in attack is an inherently subjective determination that 
will be resolved on a case-by-case basis’.42 
Currently, a system to measure the level of collateral damage has existed. For instance, 
Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology (CDEM) of the U.S allows a commander to 
make a decision of a pre-attack judgment by taking the precision of the weapon to be 
employed into consideration, attack tactics that have been planned, the possibility of the 
presence of civilians in buildings near the target, and the composition of the structure, 
in order to estimate civilian casualties.43 Besides CDEM, there are also mean to reduce 
collateral damage.  
By constraining loiter or search times, the period when collateral risks would be 
minimized can be selected.  … These human judgments at the mission planning stage 
may, in certain circumstances, ensure that an autonomous attack only takes place when 
the collateral damage that is expected would be clearly outweighed by the military 
advantage in attacking the sorts of a target to which the algorithms relate… There is, 
however, currently no known software capable of mechanising qualitative decision-
making. The process that is implicit in the application of the proportionality test is one 
that only a human brain can adequately undertake. At first glance, that would appear 
conclusively to exclude any idea that autonomous (weapon systems)can be used in 
                                                             
38  Duffy, H. (2015). The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed, 2015, p. 231-235 cited in McNab and Matthews, above 35. 
39  Claude Pilloud, Commentary to the Additional Protocols § 2198 (1987). 
40  Human Right Watch, Losing Humanity 1. 
41  Wagner, above n 31, 1395. 
42  Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Department, ‘Air Force Operations and the Law: A Guide for Air 
and Space Forces’ (1st edition, 2002) <http://web.law.und.edu/Class/militarylaw/web_assets/pdf/AF%20 
Ops%20&%20Law.pdf>. 
43  Solis, above n 3, p. 540. 
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attack… There may nevertheless be… circumstances in which the use of such systems 
would be legitimate… In short, a man need not be ‘in the loop' in all conditions.44 
Nevertheless, there are no existing means that allow AWS to meet the requirement of 
proportionality.45 There is a technical issue that robots could not differentiate accurately 
between civilians and combatants, in particular in irregular warfare, thus it could not 
fulfil the criterion to judge proportionality.46 Asaro asserts that: 
Those who plan or decide military attacks are assumed to be human, and that 
proportionality, in particular, is inherently subjective and represents not just an 
algorithmic criterion but a moral burden upon commanders to give due consideration 
to the human costs in judging whether a lethal action is justified.47 
 
3.3. Military Necessity  
Military necessity does not mean that everything is allowed to win a war instead, 
‘nothing is allowed that is not justified by military necessity’. Therefore, vicious violence 
and abusing civilians are highly prohibited.48 This was also explained in Article 14 of 
Lieber Code 1863. The application of military necessity, in the context of belligerent 
occupation, is explained in United States v List and others.49 Belligerents as the subject of 
the LOA may apply any means to enforce the complete target of the enemy. Destruction 
of life of armed opponents and others who got incidentally unavoidable destructions is 
permissible. Capturing combatants and other peculiar dangers are allowable however 
killing innocents for a reprisal or killing satisfaction is highly prohibited. The connection 
between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces must be 
reasonable. Destruction of public facilities such as railways or lines of communication is 
lawful as long as these facilities are being utilized by the enemy or for military 
purposes.50 
To determine whether AWS could follow the command of military necessity, it should 
be asked whether it can recognise military targets and then assessed whether they 
damage of the target "offers a definite military advantage."51 Even though someday AWS 
could really distinguish between a civilian and a combatant, it still needs to be under 
control of a human commander.52 
 
3.4. Unnecessary Suffering 
This principle is also called the principle of humanity, which minimise the capacity of 
combatants to follow particular “means of injuring the enemy.”53 This is an ancient 
approach to the law of war. Any suffering, injury, or damage which not necessary for 
                                                             
44   Sassóli, above n 14, 332 cited in ibid 541. 
45  Solis, above n 3, p. 541. 
46  Gubrud, above 3, p. 35. 
47  Gubrud, above 3, p. 40. 
48   Clapham, A., et al. (eds). (2015). Oxford Public International Law. Oxford University Press, p. 92. 
49  United States v List and Others (1980) 8 WCR 34. 
50   See more United States v List, and Others cited in The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), The Joint 
Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, (Joint Warfare Publications 383, 2004) , p.22. 
51  U.S Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-19:Targeting 6-17 (2006) 140 cited in Kastan, above n 27, p. 
58. 
52  Tony Gillespie & Robin West, ‘Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set by Legal 
Issues (2010) 4, International C2J 1, 9-10 cited in ibid.  
53  Bovarnick, J., et al., Law of War Deskbook (2011), U.S. Army 157 cited in Kastan, above n 19, p. 56. 
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the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes is prohibited.54 This can be found in 
Rule 70 of the ICRC Study.55 
This principle is divided into three parts: first, the prohibition of the use of “arms that 
are per se calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; second, the prohibition of the use 
“otherwise lawful arms in a manner that causes unnecessary suffering”; and the third 
one is all of those prohibitions are only applicable when the unlawful effect is 
particularly planned.56 
The essential idea of this principle is a sight of shared humanity should not be lost even 
in conflict. 57  Allowing technology to determine the fate of human lives, ‘whether 
through individual targeting decision or through a conflagration initiated by the 
unexpected interactions of machines' will be considered as heartless.58 
According to a scientific poll in the U.S, the opponents of AWS outnumbered the 
proponents of AWS two to one. Moreover, the rest of the world massively against the 
drone strikes. Therefore, it is likely that global opinion will also against AWS based on 
humanitarian grounds and the worry of the dangers of a new arms race.59  As it is 
explained in Marten Clause in regards to pre-emptive ban, AWS is a threat to global 
peace because they are in contrast to established custom, the principle of humanity, and 
dictates of public conscience. Thus, it is a matter of concern under the UN Charter.60 
However, William Boothby argues that the compatibility of AWS with this principle is 
not relevant in the recent context because the ‘the legality of the weaponry that 
autonomous and remote weapons systems deploy is independently reviewed.61 If the 
AWS does not inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, this is right. While, 
some exceptions might occur, for instance, where the AWS is itself the weapon (such as 
the Switchblade of the US),62 therefore, it is not likely that AWS will challenge this 
principle. 
 
4. Ethical and Moral Concerns 
Nonetheless, AWS is considered to have an ability to overcome main obstacles faced by 
soldiers: ‘fear of being killed and resistance to killing.’63 A human rights investigator of 
the United Nations recommends that ‘the international community urgently… address the 
legal, political, ethical and moral implications of the development of lethal robotic technologies.’64 
Anderson and Waxman state that the important moral objection to AWS is ‘deciding to 
kill away from a human and giving it to machines. Even a flawed human being is more 
                                                             
54  Ibid, p. 10. 
55  J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules (ICRC 
and Cambridge University Press, 2005) 237-244 cited in Hin-Yan Liu, ‘Categorization and Legality of 
Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems’ (94) 886, International Review of the Red Cross 627, p. 640. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Gubrud, above 3, p. 40. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Boothby, W. (2009). Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, p. 55-58 cited in Liu, 
above 55.  
62  Spencer Ackerman, ‘US Troops Will Soon Get Tiny Kamikaze Drone’, the Wired Magazine (online) 18 
October 2011 <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/tiny-kamikaze-drone/> cited in Liu, ibid p.641. 
63  Sharkey, N. (2011). ‘Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Drones’, 21, Journal of Law 140, 145 
cited in Foy, above 2, p. 62 
64  Patrick Worsnip, ‘UN Official Calls for Study of Ethics, Legality of Unmanned Weapons’, The Washington 
Post (online) 24 October 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. 
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capable of moral action than a robot without a conscience.65Moreover, AWS disturb the 
existing norms of IHL and LOA by minimising radically and illegitimately combat risk 
to the parties that employ them.66 ‘A challenge that it is unfair, dishonorable, cowardly, 
or not sporting to attack from a safe distance, whether with aircraft, submarines, or, 
today, a cruise missile, drone, or conceivably an autonomous weapon operating on its 
own.’67 
It is claimed that generally, a machine will never achieve the fundamental ethical and 
legal principles. 68  The opponents of AWS believe that there is no a programming 
machine will ever be able to take over the core elements of human emotion and 
influence. Therefore, this makes ‘human beings irreplaceable in making lethal decisions 
on the battlefield-compassion, empathy, and sympathy for other human beings’.69 
 
5. Human Responsibility of Autonomous Weapon System 
In the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946, individual criminal 
responsibility for breaches of the law of war is affirmed. ‘Crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.70 Robert 
Sparrow illustrates: 
Imagine that an airborne AWS [Autonomous Weapon System], directed by a 
sophisticated artificial intelligence, deliberately bombs a column of enemy soldiers who 
have clearly indicated their desire to surrender. The AWS had reasons for what it 
did…[but] they were not the sort to morally justify the action. Had a human being 
committed the act, they would immediately be charged with a war crime. Who should 
we try for a war crime in such a case?71 
The most debatable over AWS is who should be responsible for the use of this weapon. 
IHL clearly mentions the responsibility of the parties to an armed conflict is to respect 
the rule of international humanitarian law and they will be accountable for any 
violations. These cannot be transferred to robots.72 Thus, as it has been illustrated above, 
Sparrow argues that no one is responsible for autonomous robot’s behaviour.73 Equally, 
the developers or the military commanders should not be blamed for AWS’ actions.74 
Sparrow also proposes three main issues of the human responsibility based on 
autonomously designed systems. First, the designer should not be accountable and 
responsible. Robotics engineers only build systems that will be able to learn from 
experience and adjust with future behaviour, which has never been scripted. The success 
                                                             
65  Anderson, K., and Waxman, M. (2012). ‘Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers’ 176, Policy Review 35, 42 cited 
in Foy, above 2, 61. 
66  Anderson, K., and Waxman, M. (2013). ‘Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers’. Research Paper No 2013-11, 
American University Washington College of Law, p. 8. 
67  Ibid. 
68  ‘Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Flight of the Drones: Why the Future of Air Power Belongs to Unmanned 
Systems’, The Economist (8 October 2011) cited in Anderson and Waxman, above 66, p. 14. 
69  Anderson and Waxman, ibid. 
70   International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (Nuremberg, Sept 30-Oct 
1, 1946) 41 cited in Solis, above 9, p.544. 
71  Robert Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’ (24) 1, Journal of Applied Philosophy 62, 66-67 cited in Simpson, T.W., and 
Müller, V.C. (2016). ‘Just War and Robots’ Killings’ 66, The Philosophical Quarterly, pp.302-304. 
72  ICRC, above n 29, p. 3. 
73  Robert Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’ (24) 1, Journal of Applied Philosophy 62, 77 cited in Schulzke, M. (2013). 
‘Autonomous Weapons and Distributed Responsibility’ 26, Philosophy and Technology. pp.203-204. 
74  Ibid. 
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of the system causes the results will no be longer controllable and predictable by the 
designer, therefore, they have no responsibilities anymore. 75 Second, the Military 
commander does not have the responsibility as well. This is the distinction between 
long-range area weapons such as artillery and killer robots.76 The responsibility relation 
for such commander is usually occurring between the commander and his subordinates. 
The previous issues merely regulate the result of compliance with which the commander 
is responsible for; nonetheless, the commander is not for non-compliance of his 
subordinates.77 Last, the machine also cannot be responsible.  
Responsibility is appropriate only if the subject is an appropriate target of praise and 
blame, punishment, and reward. Robots cannot be punished, at least not until they have 
the internal complexity sufficient for the frustration of desires and suffering. But at the 
point when they are capable of this, they will likely possess the autonomy constitutive 
of full moral agents.78 
Andreas Matthias then called these three issues as a ‘responsibility gap’, in which no 
human has responsibility for the actions of a system.79 In contrast, Marcus Schulzke 
contends that the developers or the commanders can hold responsible for the actions of 
AWS. 80  Criminal responsibility might occur when the degree of control over the 
regulated action exercised by the system itself-and by extension by its developers – has 
increased to the point where it is not reasonable to say that a human operator alone 
exercises effective control’ that is, the individual who would normally decide to “pull 
the trigger” is no longer solely responsible for that decision.  
However, to proof, whether a developer is accountable for an attack by AWS, is a bit 
problematic.81 Gubrud evaluates that any use of violent force, whether it is lethal or non-
lethal, there must be a human who makes the decision in another word; this must always 
be under the control of a human.82 ”Developers”,… refer broadly to people who play 
some significant role in defining the behaviour of an autonomous weapon system, as 
opposed to “operators”, which refer to those responsible for utilizing the system in some 
situation during armed conflict.’83 A weapons system is a dead object; any harm resulted 
from it, is a result of its developers.84 In that case, a highly autonomous weapon is 
potentially partly or fully replaces combat personnel from their duty which occupied 
traditionally, so that accountability for specific acts committed through such systems is 
not likely easily ascribed to the personnel or the commander.85 Conversely, developers 
will bring bigger influence to control over. The particular actions that are performed by 
the weapon system, in fact, will perform after being deployed. Consequently, the 
accountability of a developer becomes pertinent.86 Criminal responsibility of a developer 
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can occur anytime the AWS operation relates to a performance subject to legal 
regulation, for instance, crossing an international border.87 
What is more, commitment in the course of an international and non-international of 
armed conflict is the first requirement for the prosecution of a war crime.88 However, it 
seems that the developers will have finished and completed their unlawful contribution 
to the AWS before the armed conflict itself started. Thus, their unlawful act should be 
defeated.89 In addition, the coding operations often consist of team members. In this case, 
even if the unlawful act of writing a code was finished while the armed conflicts are 
ongoing, and even if ‘the unlawful code could be discovered and isolated for 
identification after its unlawful work was done,' this can be a challenge for prosecutor 
to identify the deceive code writers among the innocent code writers.90 
Aside from the designer, it is evident that a human commander is responsible and 
accountable for making the decision. If the commander’s act is performed by another 
person who operates a weapon system, this person will be responsible and accountable 
for maintaining control of the system.91 The responsibility refers to moral and legal 
obligation and the accountability refers to a formal system that accounts for actions.92 
There is a formal policy that concerns of the development and employment of semi-
autonomous and fully autonomous systems. This policy is named the Department of 
Defense Policy Directive 3000.09, which explains that ‘the design and programming of 
an AWS must permit humans to exercise appropriate levels of control and judgement 
over the use of force.’ Moreover, this policy emphasises and set responsibility to 
individuals allowing the use of AWS.93  
 
6. Challenges of Future International Treaties 
After examining whether AWS is appropriate with the main principles of IHL and LOA 
and discussing the human responsibility of AWS, there are several challenges for 
international treaties in the future. First, there should be a precise legal definition of 
AWS. The definition would make AWS will not be complicated to define and regulate. 
The definition should explain comprehensively whether fully autonomous weapons are 
weapons or combatants, therefore legal responsibility could be identified and controlled. 
Second, there should be a particular legal treaty that governs AWS. It seems possible to 
adopt the regulation of AWS into a framework convention.94 Some suggest that a treaty 
might be in a regulatory form which confines acceptable use. This could be done by 
following the pattern of the past regulatory weapon treaties.95 
Previously, several multilateral conventions have successfully regulated some 
conventional weapons. For instance, the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and Blinding Laser Weapons, which is governed by Protocol IV. 
They are successfully regulated due to the use that in contrast with the principles of 
IHL.96 However, this cannot be done for AWS because the capability of AWS to adhere 
                                                             
87  Solis, above 9, p.545. 
88  Prosecutor v Haradinaj, et al., IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008), para 36 cited in Solis, above 9, p. 545.  
89  McFarland and McCormack, above 83, p. 374. 
90  Solis, above 9, p. 545. 
91  Gubrud, above 3, p. 37. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Young, above 28, p.34. 
94  Human Rights Watch, above 1, p.313. 
95  Anderson and Waxman, above 63, p. 20. 
96  Foy, above 2, p.66. 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 4(1): 54-67 
65 
 
to the principles of IHL is debatable.97 A multilateral treaty that has been suggested to 
ban or limit the practical use of AWS seems impractical. Therefore, the consensus is not 
likely to be possible to achieve, and compliance seems not be guaranteed.98 James Foy 
suggests that:  
Further development of AWS is necessary before a multilateral convention would be a viable 
option to regulate their use. However, waiting until the technology exists before 
implementing standards is not desirable. Guidelines and dialogue are essential during the 




Taking everything into consideration, currently, the definition of AWS is still debatable. 
Moreover, are considered is compatible with the principle of IHL, in particular, the 
principle of distinction and proportionality. Second, in regards to moral and ethical 
issues, research has found that more experts and global citizens agree that AWS will 
likely to distract moral and ethical on a battlefield and never be able to replace human’s 
feeling. A human still holds responsibility over AWS because so far there is no such a 
fully autonomous weapons exist, there is always a human commander behind the 
actions. However, whether the designer of fully autonomous weapon systems will be 
countable and responsible is still in extensive debate. Thus, to anticipate further 
violation, a new treaty should be created in order to have legally binding instruments of 
AWS. It is a challenge for the states around the word to commence negotiating process 
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